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Guardians of EU law? Analysing roles and behaviour
of Dutch legislative drafters involved in EU
compliance
Ellen Mastenbroek
Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
By drafting statutes and delegated acts, national legislative drafters play a crucial
role in European Union (EU) compliance. Given their extensive legal training,
they can be expected to operate as ‘guardians of EU law’ and thus correct
national non-compliant tendencies. Yet, they also have a role as politically
loyal civil servants, responsive to national political demands. This
conntribution answers the question of to what extent Dutch legislative
drafters fulfil a role of ‘guardian of EU law’. Using in-depth interviews, the
paper analyses legislative drafters’ role conceptions and their strategies in
case national political demands prove incompatible with EU legal
requirements. It finds that most Dutch legislative drafters try to reconcile EU
law with their ministers’ political demands, if necessary by reinterpreting EU
law. When this proves unfeasible, most respondents prioritize political loyalty
over EU legality. Ultimately, therefore, legislative drafters do not form an
insurmountable normative factor in EU compliance.
KEYWORDS Compliance; European Union; implementation; legislative drafters; role conflict;
transposition
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has a Janus-faced system of implementation.
Whereas policies are made at the EU level, implementation is largely
member states’ responsibility. This institutional feature has attracted great
academic attention in the last decades (Angelova et al. 2012; Treib 2014).
The consensus amongst compliance researchers is that the institutional
setup of the EU offers ample leeway for ‘politics of compliance’ (Mastenbroek
2005).
So far, most theories on EU compliance have been rationalist in nature.
Several authors view domestic transposition and implementation as
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processes in which various domestic stakeholders must agree on a particular
outcome (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2000; Kaeding 2008; Mastenbroek and
Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg 2006). Central to these rationalist accounts are
the preference constellations of alleged preference-maximizing domestic
actors. Compliance then revolves around the question ‘who gets what, how,
and when’ (Kaeding 2008: 116).
This rationalist position disregards normative factors promoting compli-
ance. Just like individual citizens (Gibson and Caldeira 1996), individual poli-
ticians and civil servants involved in compliance processes may vary in their
propensity to comply with EU law (Burcu Bayram 2017; Wockelberg 2014).
These variant stances towards EU law are likely to have consequences for
administrators’ compliance behaviour, and thus for the functioning of the
larger political–legal system in which they operate – the EU.
It could be argued that domestic actors’ normative stances towards EU law
may be affected by their involvement at the EU level (Quaglia et al. 2008;
Beyers 2010). However, the general conclusion from the research on EU socia-
lization has been that national civil servants involved in EU decision-making at
most develop a weak EU loyalty, which coexists with national identity (Quaglia
et al. 2008: 160). National administration ‘remains the key point of reference
for national officials … [who] continue to classify themselves as national
agents, although they perform both national and European roles’ (Connaugh-
ton 2015: 201–2). To quote Egeberg (1999: 461): ‘most obligations, expec-
tations, information networks, incentives and sanctions are connected to
the institutions that employ them nationally’.
This sobering conclusion may partly result from selection bias, i.e., the focus
on civil servants involved in EU negotiations. Although these officials closely
engage with counterparts from other member states and the EU institutions,
socialization may not materialize. That is, these civil servants have as their key
role the articulation and defence of national policy preferences, underpinned
by rigid negotiation mandates and advanced negotiation skills aimed at max-
imizing national utilities. Hence, it should not surprise us that national nego-
tiators have been found not to develop strong EU loyalties.
This contribution studies a more likely case for the development of norma-
tive factors conducive to EU compliance, by studying Dutch legislative drafters.
These civil servants, who typically hold university legal degrees, have as their
core task the provision of legal input in the process of drafting bills and del-
egated legislation (Tholen and Mastenbroek 2013: 489). They typically carry
out several EU-related tasks: drafting bills and measures that transpose EU
directives; guarding the compatibility of national law with EU requirements
flowing from directly binding legislation; and ensuring the compatibility of
‘autonomous’ bills- i.e., regular national proposals for new legislation – with
EU law.
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Crucially, these legislative drafters can be argued to be ‘double hatters’
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009: 779): actors with roles related to both their
national operating context and the European context. Just like national
judges, they may have obtained a ‘Community mantle’ (Maher 1994: 234).
First, their role is first and foremost to guard legality (Tholen and Mastenbroek
2013: 489) – which comprises EU legal requirements (Veerman 2007). Second,
this role conception is underpinned by a strong professional identity, which
may counterbalance political loyalty (Van den Berg and Dijkstra 2015: 253).
Third, this role conception is transmitted through extensive university-level
education and postdoctoral training.1 This group is fully aware of the key prin-
ciples of EU law, such as supremacy, autonomy of EU law and Community
loyalty. Fourth, in line with their standing as conscience of the rechtsstaat,
Dutch legislative drafters have a rather autonomous organizational position,
mostly separated from so-called policy officials, who work in substantive
policy divisions (cf. Page 2003: 654). Fifth, as EU compliance is a highly special-
ized job, they are likely to have a great knowledge advantage over their
minister. Not surprisingly, the Dutch legislative drafting profession has been
criticized on several counts for its inflexible stance vis-à-vis policy demands
(Mastenbroek 2007: 149–50). Finally, the Netherlands is known for its strong
rule of law (Gibson and Caldeira 1996: 70), which further increases the
chances of identifying a normative counterweight to purely political processes
of compliance.
In sum, national legislative drafters may be seen as a more, if not most,
likely case2 for the prioritization of EU law over incompatible national political
demands. Crucially, this contribution addresses the question of to what extent
these legislative drafters indeed prioritize EU legal requirements over (incom-
patible) policy demands by their minister – thus providing a normative coun-
terweight to the national politics of EU compliance. More specifically, the
study analyses to what extent these drafters heed their role of ‘guardians of
EU law’ and how they balance this role with that of a politically loyal civil
servant – like any national civil servant, they also are expected to be respon-
sive to their minister’s political preferences.
To analyse the EU-related roles of legislative drafters, the study develops a
typology based on cross-fertilization between Christensen’s (1991) typology
of bureaucratic role conceptions with the literature on the ethics of legislative
drafting (Purdy 1987; MacNair 2003) and executive branch legal interpretation
(Moss 2000; Luban 2006). Three role conceptions are distinguished. The first
conceives of the legislative drafter as a politically loyal translator driven by
the minister’s policy demands; legal requirements only being involved in
terms of risk assessment. The second role is that of the guardian of EU law.
Driven by notions of professional autonomy, the drafter is to develop the
best view of EU law, steering clear of political influence. The third role is an
integrating position, according to which legislative drafters must do justice
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to both domestic political demands and EU legal requirements. After sketch-
ing legislative drafters’ role conceptions concerning EU compliance and their
ways of integrating EU legal requirements with national political demands, the
contribution further explores the strategies used by those drafters in cases of
irresolvable incompatibilities.
By analysing role conceptions and strategies of legislative drafters, the
present study adds to the literature on EU compliance. First, it goes beyond
the somewhat dichotomous understanding typical to EU transposition
studies (for exceptions, see Thomann 2015; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek
forthcoming). Instead of tracing compliance with EU rules from the top–
down, it analyses the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants involved in
EU compliance in a bottom–up manner. By studying whether and how legis-
lative drafters integrate EU legal requirements with national political
demands, this contribution hence adopts a ‘performance’ view on compliance
(Thomann and Sager 2017). Second, the contribution adds to the literature
on EU socialization. Crucially, given the importance of education as a ‘trans-
mission belt’ for socialization (Trondal 2004: 8), legislative drafters are an inter-
esting group to study. If we find no clear EU loyalty amongst this group of civil
servants deeply trained and instructed in the fact that EU law should prevail
over national political demands, where else are we to find this sense of
loyalty?
Roles of legislative drafters in an EU context
A role is ‘the behavior expected of an actor in a specific social situation’
(Beyers 2005: 902; see also Rizzo et al. 1970). A distinction can be made
between external role expectations and internal role conceptions, or ‘those
norms, rules, expectations and prescriptions of appropriate behavior per-
ceived by individual officials’ (Beyers and Trondal 2004: 920).
Christensen (1991) argued that the central tension in the work of civil ser-
vants is that between political loyalty and professional autonomy. According to
the former principle, civil servants must be loyal to their political superiors.
Beyers and Trondal (2004: 923–4), in line with Wahlke et al. (1962), called
this the ‘imperative model of representation’. The principle of professional
autonomy (Christensen 1991: 310), by contrast, implies that civil servants
have their own professional obligations. This position corresponds with the
‘liberal model’ of Beyers and Trondal (2004: 923–4), according to which
bureaucrats are independent experts. These two general bureaucratic roles
can be used to derive two different EU-related role conceptions (cf. Wockel-
berg 2014), tailored to the work of legislative drafters working on EU
matters. While the first role is driven by national political loyalty, the second
role is driven by professional autonomy – in this case meaning the prioritiza-
tion of EU legal requirements.3
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First, national civil servants involved in EU affairs could be seen as loyal to
their national minister.4 In legal ethics, this is known as the translator5 position
(Purdy 1987: 80). Drafters-as-translators should transform their political
superiors’ instructions into legal terminology (MacNair 2003: 145). Crucially,
drafters in this role conception should act ‘non-judgmentally’ and ‘as directed’
(Purdy 1987: 79, 95). Legal considerations may enter the equation – but not for
an intrinsic, deontological reason. To fully effectuate the principle of political
loyalty, the drafter should not automatically transform all political instructions.
Instead, they should also advise on the risks of a desired course of action, thus
protecting their political superiors’ interests, such as staying in office. In this
view, it is a drafter’s duty to fully inform their superiors on the consequences
of their actions (Purdy 1987: 100).
Alternatively, extending the principle of professional autonomy (Christen-
sen 1991: 310), legislative drafters can be viewed as autonomous professionals.
In this view, drafters should prioritize their profession-specific expertise. A
drafter’s cardinal duty, according to the legislative ethics literature, is to
ensure the rule of law (MacNair 2003: 145), while working for a political
principal. In the words of legal ethicist Wendel (2005: 6): ‘[governmental]
lawyers6 may not treat the law instrumentally, as an obstacle to be planned
around, but must treat legal norms as legitimate reasons for political action
in their practical deliberation’.
A similar view can be gleaned from Moss (2000). Under his ‘neutral expo-
sitor model’, the government lawyer must act as a judge instead of an advo-
cate, steering clear from political influence. They should work from the ‘best
view of the law’ (Moss 2000: 1306) and deliver advice that is ‘objective and
not colored by the exigencies of a particular circumstance or policy goal’
(ibid.: 1310). They should tell their client ‘what the law is … , regardless of
what the client wishes it to be’ (Luban, 2005). This position seems highly rel-
evant for understanding the role of legislative drafters working on EU
matters. As a result of the EU legal principles of autonomy, supremacy and
Community Loyalty, member states cannot autonomously decide whether
or not to comply with EC law: they have voluntarily and irreversibly transferred
certain legislative powers to the Community and are obliged to comply with
the legal provisions arising from the use of these powers (Kapteyn and VerLo-
ren van Themaat 1998: 81). Drafters involved in EU compliance can thus be
seen as guardians of EU law.7
The previous two role conceptions are each guided by one normative prin-
ciple. However, we can also conceive of an integrated role conception (Hall
1972), which does justice to both principles. In the legal ethics literature,
Moss (2000) developed such an integrated role conception. According to
this conception, the drafter is to proffer ‘any reasonable argument, in
support of his client’s policy objectives’. This role is modelled on that of an
advocate, who may zealously present his client in the most favourable light
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(Luban [2006]: 69), while staying within legal limits. According to this position,
which we will call the integrating professional, democratically elected political
superiors are responsible for political decisions, while having to remain within
legal bounds. Integrating professionals are expected to base their actions and
choices on both their superior’s policy objectives and EU legal requirements.
This integrating position may be tenable in many circumstances: political
loyalty and professional expertise may very well coexist (Christensen 1991:
315). However, if national political demands are irreconcilable with EU legal
requirements, the integrating position may result in mutually incompatible
behavioural prescriptions for a civil servant, a situation denoted as role conflict
(Driscoll 1981: 179). Such situations are characterized by the absence of an
institutionalized formula for reconciling the opposed demands (Toby 1952:
326). This situation is endemic to the work of legislative drafters, as argued
by Veerman (2007: 83), a renowned Dutch specialist on legislative drafting:
If a particular policy is deemed necessary by a politician but undesirable by
legislative drafters, it is seldom possible to bring these diametrically opposed
points of view in equilibrium using a yardstick that is relevant for both ‘politics’
and ‘law’.
Accordingly, the role of the integrating professional is intrinsically unstable.
When legal limits and political demands are incompatible, the drafter must
make a difficult choice. According to the legal ethics perspective, the
drafter eventually must prioritize the legal and constitutional limitations
over political demands. The key here is with the term ‘reasonable argument,’
(Purdy 1987: 85). When a drafter cannot come up with a reasonable argument,
i.e., if ‘the legal hurdles are clearly insurmountable’, they should block their
superior from reaching their policy objectives (Moss 2000: 1306). The drafter’s
primary duty is to the legislative process, which has crystallized into a body of
law – not to individual political supervisors (Purdy 1987).
So as to prioritize legal requirements over incompatible political demands,
the drafter has a menu of strategies at their disposal, ordered in terms of
increasing severity (Purdy 1987: 83–5). First, and most benignly, they could
try to advise the legislator on possible alternatives to their principal’s proposal
and advise on the implications and consequences of the various alternatives.
This advice need not be limited to legal matters, but may comprise political,
societal or other considerations (ibid.). Second, they could try to dissuade the
principal of their desired course of action. Third, they could disassociate
with the bill, by asking to withdraw from it, avoiding public endorsement,
or avoiding ‘signing off’. Fourth, much more sensitively, they could voice
their concerns to others. Ultimately, they could decline to draw the bill
altogether: ‘If assisting the legislator would involve the drafter in clear
wrongs … the drafter should refuse to so act’ (Purdy 1987: 82). This is an
extreme strategy, which according to Purdy (ibid.: 86), should only be used
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when no other means are available. In sum, according to this position, if
national political demands are incompatible with legal injunctions, the
drafter should prioritize the latter, a course of action for which a number of
strategies are available.
Methods and data
Having sketched these alternative role conceptions, three questions present
themselves: which of the role conceptions is dominant among Dutch legisla-
tive drafters; how do drafters with an integrated role conception try to
connect EU legal requirements with national political demands; and which
strategies do they use in case of irresolvable incompatibilities? These ques-
tions will be answered using data from a research project funded by the
Dutch Ministry of Justice (Mastenbroek and Peeters Weem 2009), aimed at
studying the extent, forms and depth of Europeanization of the work of
Dutch legislative drafters. Part of this project concerned the role conceptions,
dilemmas and coping strategies of drafters working on EU matters.
The research for this contribution consisted of two sets of interviews. First,
11 interviews were held with key persons in the field of legislative drafting in
the Netherlands. These interviews served to explore the topic and important
dimensions to the work of ‘Europeanized’ drafters. Second, 20 in-depth inter-
views were held with civil servants actually involved in legislative drafting.
This contribution primarily focuses on the second series of interviews.
With an eye to case selection, the following considerations were central.
Given the focus on EU-affected legislative drafting, the analysis was restricted
to departments with both a sizeable law production and an important EU
legal input. We thus excluded the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture & Science and the Defence Ministry. Second, we narrowed our
scope to the work done in the central legislative divisions. At each of the
departments studied, we interviewed both a legislative drafter and their
manager in order to enhance representativeness of the findings. As the
research was exploratory rather than theory-testing, we intended to maximize
empirical heterogeneity by using a most different systems design (Przeworski
and Teune 1970: 34), involving selection of respondents who differed on
key background variables. The advantage of this design is that it maximizes
the chances of identifying different ways of dealing with EU-related role
conflict.
The background variables were seniority and role integration. Seniority, to
begin with, is expected to affect the basic role orientation of civil servants, as
civil servants with more years of tenure are expected to be more sensitive to
political pressures (Christensen 1991: 309). In addition, as stressed by several
respondents in the first interview round, a shift in role orientation has
occurred over the last 15 years, resulting in a more pragmatic, i.e., more
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1295
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
7:2
3 1
7 A
ug
ust
 20
17
 
political, attitude towards EU-law. This is likely to affect the extent to which
drafters experience EU law-induced role conflict and the ways in which they
cope with role conflict in EU compliance. On the other hand, it could be
argued that higher-level civil servants are more willing to speak up, given
the fact that they already have an established reputation in the organization.
A second background variable was role integration. The question here is
whether drafters have a purely legislative role, or also operate as policy offi-
cials – primarily responsible for heeding policy demands.8 The expectation
is that legislative drafters who also have a policy responsibility are more
attuned to political demands.
Christensen (1991: 305) distinguishes two types of questions concerning
bureaucratic roles. The first type focuses on actual decision problems experi-
enced by civil servants, and then serves to distil the political and professional
elements in their role. The second type focuses on respondents’ role percep-
tions and decision-making criteria in a more generalized fashion. Arguably,
the advantage of the former strategy is that it is close to the world of
meaning of the respondents. Tapping into real-life situations reduces the
chances of socially desirable answers. At the same time, we can wonder to
what extent these situations are representative of the full scope of activities
these civil servants engaged in. Therefore, the interviews contained a mix of
questions. The respondents were first asked to sketch their background:
their training and career, as well as typical EU-related activities – either of
themselves (drafters), or within their unit (managers). Next, follow-up ques-
tions were asked to gauge their EU-related role conceptions. Here, individuals
would typically be asked which norms and values guide them when carrying
out EU-related work or when they feel they have done a good job on their
EU-related activities. Questions were phrased in such a way as to go
beyond the specific dossier, in line with Christensen’s (1991) second strategy.
In addition, with an eye on the representativeness of the findings, managers
were specifically asked to reflect on broader patterns in their unit and individ-
ual drafters were invited to sketch a general normative framework, not rel-
evant to one ‘dossier’ only. The study thus mixed the two strategies
suggested by Christensen (1991).
The role conceptions were established rather inductively, because the
theory does not provide clear operationalization. Instead, potential ‘codes’
were derived from the theoretical descriptions of the three role conceptions.
To be qualified as ‘guardian of EU law’ a respondent needed to mention policy
objectives or policy wishes of their political superior as key norms and values.
EU legal requirements could be mentioned, but in terms of risk assessment
instead of intrinsic importance. The integrating role conceptions requires
mention of policy objectives/wishes of their political superior as well as EU
legal requirements as key norms and values underpinning one’s work.
Instead, mention of strategies to make the two available, and mention of
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the search for ‘reasonable’ arguments would lead to the qualification of an
integrating role. Thirdly, in order to qualify as a ‘guardian of EU law’, a respon-
dent would have to mention the importance of EU legal requirements as a key
value, without mentioning the importance of policy objectives/policy wishes.
Mention of the search for the ‘best view of law’ would also be an important
indication. These codes were not regarded as fully exclusive, because respon-
dents may use slightly different wording. Necessarily, therefore, the researcher
needed to engage in some interpretation. To maximize transparency, the
main empirical ‘indications’ for attaching a particular theoretical label to the
role conception of a particular respondent are reported in the analysis
(Table 1).
Next, those respondents who subscribed to an integrated position were
questioned about their strategies for combining EU legal requirements with
Table 1. Role conception of respondents.
Position
Principle
Role conceptionPolitical demands EU legality
1 Drafter / Fine and timely
implementation
Guardian of EU law
2 Manager (Political) will formation Legal aspects Integrating
professional
3 Drafter Policy (objectives) / primary process Limits of EU law Integrating
professional
4 Manager Enable minister / Translator
5 Drafter Make your minister happy EU law Integrating
professional
6 Manager Minister’s choice EU legal requirements Integrating
professional
7 Drafter Rules, duties, and rights we want to
enact in the NL
EU legal boundaries Integrating
professional
8 Manager Policy wishes (EU) legal boundaries Integrating
professional
9 Drafter Policy objectives (EU) legal boundaries Integrating
professional
10 Drafter Political choices Good legal
implementation
Integrating
professional
11 Manager Think along with policy officials (EU) legal requirements Integrating
professional
12 Drafter Policy (EU) law Integrating
professional
13 Drafter Not discussed
14 Manager Policy wishes (EU) legal boundaries Integrating
professional
15 Manager Political wishes EU law Integrating
professional
16 Drafter National political wishes EU requirements Integrating
professional
17 Manager Not discussed
18 Drafter Material practice in the NL EU law Integrating
professional
19 Manager Not discussed
20 Drafter Minister’s choice EU legal requirements Integrating
professional
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national political demands. With an eye on anonymity, though, specific
examples are not reported. Furthermore, we invited them to provide infor-
mation on the steps in case EU legal requirements proved incompatible
with national political demands. Because such instances are rare, we asked
the respondents whenever possible to provide information on specific
instances of role conflict, rather than asking for generalized strategies.
Finally, managers and drafters were interviewed separately where possible,
to prevent socially desirable answers. To improve reliability, the interviews
were analysed and coded by two coders. The first coder made a proposal
for coding, which was later checked and, wherever necessary, amended by
the second coder after joint deliberation.
Analysis
Role conceptions of Dutch legislative drafters
Most of the respondents were able and willing to reflect on their EU-related
role conception.9 As shown in Table 1, only one of these respondents – a
drafter – explicitly fit our description of EU guardian role. He indicated that
his primary objective is to ensure substantively ‘fine’ and timely implemen-
tation, without making any reference to the role of policy objectives.
At the other extreme, one respondent – a manager – explicitly subscribed
to the role of translator. He explained he was driven by the principle of politi-
cal loyalty. In his view, it is the drafter’s duty to think along with his minister
and to help him reach his objectives: ‘you are an instrument maker rather than
an inspector’. EU law, in his view, does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to
policy objectives. As he explained, ‘we have learnt that we don’t need to treat
directives as legislation … they are almost nothing more than a judicial
decision or a parliamentary motion’. According to this respondent, this
trend contrasts with the approach of the older generation of legislative draf-
ters, who tended to implement directives somewhat fastidiously. ‘Now we
implement in the most attractive way possible. We try to get away with it.’
In this respondent’s view, it is the drafter’s duty to enable the minister to
make his or her own decision. If a minister’s policy objectives run counter
to EU law, the drafter has to advise him on the risks of the illegal course of
action, which is in line with the translator position sketched above. ‘I would
point out the risks, by saying: “I wouldn’t do it, but if you want to anyway,
these are the risks. We are civil servants.”
The great majority of the respondents, however, held an integrated role
conception, trying to combine the demands of their political superior with
EU legal requirements. To quote one of them, ‘you have to make your minister
happy, while ensuring correspondence with EU law.’ More specifically, several
respondents spoke about sensitivity to their ministers’ policy wishes. As one of
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them explained: ‘you think along about the rules, duties, and rights we want
to enact in the Netherlands’. Such a position implies sensitivity to policy
wishes, and hence cannot be resolved with the EU legal guardian role,
which concerns developing the ‘best view of law’ in isolation from policy
pressures. On the other hand, these respondents stressed that they try to
stay within the boundaries of EU law.
Integrating EU law and national politics: the importance of
interpretation
The interviews yielded interesting information about the ways in which legis-
lative drafters try to integrate EU legal limits and political wishes. The strategy
mentioned most often (eight drafters) was interpretation of the EU legal fra-
mework. As explained by one respondent:
You have to be creative and flexible with the legal preconditions. … The main
challenge is to make possible what (the minister) wants – in one way or another.
Yet there are limits to this ‘conceptual ﬂexibility’. One respondent explained
how he would explore the legal boundaries, while making sure that his
interpretation remained justiﬁable. This remark may be connected to Moss’s
(2000) notion of ‘reasonable argument’. As another respondent explained,
interpretation in the end comes down to ‘settling the boundaries of EU
law’. This is not a straightforward task; it is a complicated balancing act invol-
ving creative puzzling, as one of them explained: ‘When I shape it like this, it
may be possible, but if I shape it differently, surely not.’ Others seemed to be
more ﬂexible, as indicated by one manager: ‘You shouldn’t take EU law too
literally, you have to treat it more ﬂexibly.’
Limits of the integrating position: irresolvable compatibilities
Most respondents hence hold an integrated role conception, trying to
connect national political demands with EU legal considerations. Yet, there
are limits to this flexibility: incompatibilities may occur. Choosing to uphold
EU law then means compromising one’s loyalty to the minister, and vice
versa. Most interviewees mentioned the occurrence of such incompatibilities.
According to one of them: ‘Politics and business don’t want us to be the best
pupil in the class. So you are under a lot of pressure to loosen the way you
apply EU law.’ Finally, it must be noted that most drafters argue that such
incompatibilities are the exception rather than the rule.
Incompatibilities between political loyalty and EU legality were reported to
occur at various stages of the EU policy process. First, tensions between legal
quality and policy wishes may occur in the stage of transposition. According
to one respondent, ‘politicians have a hard time accepting a loss of policy
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freedom, when there is law coming from Brussels.’ Another respondent men-
tioned the high costs of implementation, which may make suboptimal
implementation attractive. Another dilemma relates to the actual application
of the transposed EU law. Often, implementing agencies demand all kinds of
exceptions to EU law. Policy officials are reported to then put pressure on leg-
islative drafters to think of ‘tricks’. According to a respondent, many dilemmas
relating to EU law run along these lines. Incompatibilities may also occur
during the making of autonomous (domestic) legislation, as explained by five
respondents. One of them conveyed that his division often receives policy
demands that go against EU law. Another interviewee gave the example of
a vast deregulation scheme, proposed by a policy division, which entailed
that half of all legislation in force was to be cut. The legislative division indi-
cated that this was impossible, as some 90 per cent of this legislation origi-
nated from the EU. Another respondent added that these conflicts often
concern EU law relating to procurement and state aid:
In such a case I will tell them that this is against the rules. Yet in some cases they
decide to go ahead anyway.
Dealing with incompatibilities
If interpretation runs against EU legal limits, the drafter is stuck between a rock
and a hard place: he/she must prioritize either political loyalty or EU legality.
According to the integrating role conception developed in legal ethics, law
should ultimately prevail. Four of the 15 respondents with an integrated
role conception – all of them drafters instead of managers – indeed indicated
that they would ultimately prioritize EU law. There are limits to ‘conceptual
flexibility’:
In the end people have to accept the inevitable. … If I’d have to exceed the
limits of EU law, this simply would not happen.
Another respondent took a similar stance, stating that ‘there is simply no room
to help your own sector’. In such a case, a department’s attitude towards the
value of the EU works as a lubricant, as another respondent asserted: ‘Every-
one at the department understands that EU law takes primacy.’ Similarly, at
another highly Europeanized department, the policy divisions were reported
to accept the EU’s legal limitations on national policy.
One drafter explicitly stated that they would ultimately decline to draft the
deficient measure, the most extreme strategy given by Purdy (1987). An alterna-
tive is to go along with the deficient draft, while avoiding signing it off –
disassociation in Purdy’s terms. Such steps are not taken lightly. Most drafters
use various strategies before prioritizing EU law over political demands.
Other strategies mentioned, much in line with Purdy’s ladder, are trying to
dissuade their policy counterpart and eventually the minister, and suggesting
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alternatives that are in line with EU law. Two respondents explained how they
would focus on the EU level, by consulting the European Commission or
seeking support from other member states for the Dutch policy objectives.
However, 11 of the 15 respondents (9 of which were managers) with an
integrated role conception would ultimately prioritize political demands.
Commonly, these respondents argued that their political principal has the
final policy-making responsibility, and that the task of the drafter is to
enable their minister to take sound decisions. ‘As a civil servant,’ one respon-
dent explained, ‘you have to be “as loyal as a puppy”.’ In someone else’s
words, this may mean having to work on something that is legally question-
able. One manager was particularly outspoken about this possibility:
A drafter is not a guardian of the law. … It is your job to serve your minister as
well as possible. The minister is your boss. You have to inform the minister well,
and … make sure that he knows what he does. But when push comes to shove,
he is responsible. That is the core of a civil servant’s existence.
According to these respondents, drafters should not slavishly follow policy
demands, but instead make their minister well aware that he is violating EU
law – and of the risks involved. Two respondents provided details on such
risk assessments. Crucial considerations are the chances of a ‘political mess’,
ﬁnancial consequences – for instance resulting from possible ECJ cases –
and the chances that stakeholders will ﬁle a lawsuit. On the basis of such
an assessment, the minister must decide whether or not to maintain his
plans; ‘politics settle the dilemma in the end’. In other words:
When (my minister) really wants something, we will think of a supporting
argument.
Finally, one respondent disclosed a more covert way of serving their superior’s
political objectives, namely by omitting checks on EU legality. This strategy
was also mentioned by the respondent who positioned himself as a translator.
As one of them explained, drafters may decide not to inform their manager of
inopportune EU legal requirements and risks involved if doing so would com-
plicate the minister’s position. By withholding information the minister ‘may
always claim ignorance.’ Another manager conveyed that this is rather
common practice, explaining how EU law ‘used to be neglected out of ignor-
ance, but now is neglected intentionally’.
Interestingly, the respondents also employ various strategies before prior-
itizing political demands over incompatible EU law: providing alternatives to
their policy counterpart or minister; building rapport to increase the interest in
drafters’ arguments; and trying to dissuade their policy counterpart or minis-
ter. These are in line with the strategies listed by Purdy (1987). Accordingly,
every step of the ladder provides the opportunity of yielding to politics.
Other strategies mentioned were to find information about the limits of EU
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law, to negotiate with a policy division and surrender on less important points
of contention. Finally, two additional respondents described that they would
try to change EU law or seek support for the Dutch position from other
member states or the European Commission. These strategies indicate that
prioritization of politics over EU law is not a straightforward move for a legis-
lative drafter, but an ultimo remedio.
Conclusion
This contribution has explored the role conceptions and strategies of Dutch
legislative drafters with EU-related tasks. On the basis of the literature on leg-
islative ethics, three distinct roles were constructed. Translators, working from
a concern with political loyalty, are led by their ministers’ policy demands.
They may take EU legal limits into account, but only in a teleological sense,
advising their ministers on the risk of an illegal course of action. Legality
does not figure as an intrinsic concern. The guardian of EU law does not
take into account policy demands during EU compliance, but strives for the
best interpretation of EU law. The integrating professional, finally, seeks to
connect policy demands with EU legal requirements, in case of clear incom-
patibilities prioritizing the latter.
Interviews with legislative drafters and their managers provided us with a
wealth of information on their EU-related role perceptions. The majority of
respondents recognized the dual roles shaping their work: they try to inte-
grate EU legal requirements with national policy demands. This policy-sensi-
tive attitude was alleged to be a recent development, also pertinent to law
in general (cf. Van den Berg and Dijkstra 2015). The main strategy used by
this group was to reinterpret EU law in such a way as to reconcile domestic
political demands with EU legal requirements.
However, most respondents recognized that irresolvable incompatibilities
may arise, either during implementation or national law-making. How do draf-
ters go about settling such incompatibilities? A majority of respondents indi-
cated that, ultimately, they prioritize political demands over EU legal
requirements, even if this choice is not taken lightly and often is preceded by
several strategies to guard EU law. Aminority of respondentswith an integrated
position, all at the level of drafter, argued that they would not give in to policy
pressure and, when push comes to shove, uphold EU law against incompatible
national policy objectives. Managers seemedmore attuned to the policy needs
of their minister and more willing to compromise the ‘best view of EU law’.
In sum, even Dutch legislative drafters, a group of civil servants very likely
to prioritize EU legal requirements over incompatible national policy
demands, may not do so if presented with irresolvable incompatibilities.
Just like national civil servants engaged in EU decision-making, most legisla-
tive drafters ultimately prioritize political loyalty. Because Dutch legislative
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drafters may be seen as a rather crucial case for a normative correction on the
politics of EU compliance, we should expect such pragmatic processes to
operate in other member states as well – which strengthens the image of
‘patchwork Europe’ (Héritier 1996).
In the end, therefore, compliance indeed is driven by domestic preferences,
as assumed by rationalist theories on EU compliance. Yet, this is not a matter
of top–down adaptation. This study’s findings are in line with the ‘perform-
ance’ view of EU compliance charted in this collection (Thomann and Sager
2017). Compliance is often a creative process of wedding EU legal require-
ments with domestic policy demands. Such interpretation may be seen as a
key strategy leading to domestication (ibid.) of EU law at the domestic level.
Our analysis has three implications for the conceptual model used. First,
whereas the integrated position sketched above prescribes an ultimate prior-
itization of EU law, most drafters eventually prioritize political demands.
Persons in an integrated position may thus shift to either of the two pure
roles in case of persistent incompatibilities. Second, the strategies identified
by Purdy (1987) may be used by both groups of drafters; each step of the
ladder offers the possibility to proceed on the ladder of escalation, or to prior-
itize either political demands or legal limits. Third, several strategies were
identified in addition to those mentioned by Purdy (1987): omitting checks
on legality; building rapport to strengthen one’s position; finding additional
information and negotiating with policy experts; trying to change EU law;
or activating other actors.
This contribution offers various avenues for further research. First, the study
was explicitly exploratory in nature. A logical next stepwould be amore deduc-
tive approach, preferably using a large-N strategy, to obtain more representa-
tive findings. The advantage of such an analysis would be to include other
types of civil servants, and to incorporate background variables and theoreti-
cally informed variables such as instrumental and normative considerations
(Dörrenbächer 2017). Such a study would provide us with more representative
insights into the prevalence of conflicting demands in the face of EU law and
shed light on the variance and antecedents of EU-related attitudes. Second,
this study raises the question of comparison. Initially, the Dutch administrative
context seemed a rather likely case, given the rather strong EU rule of law
(Gibson and Caldeira 1996). Yet, given the observation by both respondents
and researchers (Van den Berg and Dijkstra 2015) that the rule of law among
legislative drafters and other types of civils servants has declined more gener-
ally, it would be interesting to repeat this study in other EUmember states with
a strong rule of law, such as Denmark and Sweden. Third, we could extend the
analysis to a third group of national civil servants have been presented as an
even more likely case to display pro-European loyalties: agency personnel.
This group thus merits further empirical scrutiny to uncover normative
checks on domestic non-compliance.
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Notes
1. See http://academievoorwetgeving.nl/page/about-the-academy
2. Arguably, they are not a most likely case for the development of an indepen-
dent EU loyalty, because they still form part of a ministry, if not positioned
in the hierarchical line. This is different for agency personnel, which have
been decoupled from the ministerial hierarchy, which may enhance the likeli-
ness that they develop a sense of EU loyalty (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Wock-
elberg 2014).
3. I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for the useful observation that the pro-
posed distinction is somewhat of a simplification, as it neglects the fact that
there is an additional dimension informing the role conceptions: EU- versus
nationally informed. Combining this distinction with that made by Christensen
(1991), we could conceive of two additional role conceptions: one prioritizing
EU political demands; and one prioritizing national law. Yet, given this contri-
bution’s focus on the existence of a normative counterweight on political
demands during processes of EU compliance, the choice is to focus on the
role conceptions revolving around EU legal requirements and national political
demands. See Dörrenbächer (2017) for an analysis of civil servants confronted
with incompatibilities between EU and national law.
4. Technically, in line with the previous note, legislative drafters could also be loyal
to an EU-level principal, for instance the European Commission. This option is not
taken into account in the study, given its focus on the politics of compliance at
the national level. The interviews also did not provide evidence for this possibility.
5. Confusingly, Purdy (1987) uses the term ‘advocacy’ to denote the drafter-as-
translator role. Please note the difference with the advocacy model of Moss
(2000), explained later in this section, which does recognize the existence of
legal limitations to policy wishes.
6. The analysis by Wendel (2005) is not restricted to advising by governmental
lawyers – it also encompasses lawyers more broadly.
7. It must be noted that there are many instances in which the EU’s legal
requirements are not clear, e.g., due to ambiguous or complicated phrasing
or incompatibilities between pieces of EU law. In these cases, according to
the normative position of the guardian of EU law, legislative drafters are to
develop their best view of the law, using as many different sources as
possible.
8. As explained in the introduction, in most Dutch ministries this function explicitly
differs from that of the legislative drafter. The policy official or administrator is to
realize the minister’s policy demands, e.g., by developing policies and legislation
(Tholen and Mastenbroek 2013: 490).
9. The three respondents who did not reflect on the role of a drafter in EU
implementation/the making of autonomous legislation primarily talked about
their role in EU negotiations, which is beyond the scope of this study.
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